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T HE legal concept of privacy is extremely troublesome. The
difficulty in discerning the true boundaries of the theory
stems from the fundamental disagreement among courts and the-
orists over just what the right entails. Some argue that privacy re-
fers to control over information.1 According to this view, we en-
joy privacy if we have control over information about ourselves.
Others feel that privacy refers to something more than, or at least
quite different from, information control. For these theorists, au-
tonomy is the hallmark of privacy interests. We have privacy, ac-
cording to this view, if we are free to experiment with alternative
lifestyles,2 to form and preserve intimate associations,8 and, more
generally, to undergo any experience we desire.4
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These two views of privacy, the "information control" and
"autonomy" constructs, have developed separately in the law. The
former is most applicable to the tort law of privacy. The latter
had its birth in the Supreme Court's recognition of a constitu-
tional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.5 Very few theories
of privacy have attempted to account for both branches of law.,
The model of privacy to be set forth in this Article is one such
attempt.
A model of privacy should account for all the different kinds
of situations in which the courts hold that a privacy claim is genu-
inely implicated. Neither the information control nor the
autonomy-based theory accurately depicts the scope of privacy in-
terests recognized by the legislatures and by the courts. Even at
the most superficial level of analysis it must be acknowledged that
since both information control and autonomy-based privacy inter-
ests are recognized by the courts,7 neither school of thought taken
by itself can account for the entire range of privacy interests. This
alone would be a reason for constructing a model which combines
the two, and ideally one which identifies any and all common fea-
tures of the two facets of privacy.
There is, however, a far more troublesome deficiency in the
traditional schools of thought. This Article contends that each of
the two competing views fails to depict accurately even that
branch of privacy law which it claims as its province; that is, the
information control school of thought does not accurately de-
scribe even the law of privacy in torts, and the autonomy-based
school of thought does not satisfactorily describe the pattern of
the Supreme Court's holdings in the area of constitutional
privacy.
Most states with privacy statutes8 have adopted some form of
26 (1976); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CA-
ux. L. REv. 1447 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy]; Note, Forni-
cation, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MicH. L. REv. 252 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Fornication]; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 670 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, On Privacy].
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. One notable exception is Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (factual revelation of a
reformed prostitute's past deemed an actionable invasion of privacy as information con-
trol); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (1975) (autonomy-based privacy protects possessor of
small quantity of marijuana).
8. As of 1976, privacy was recognized in all but two or three states. W. PROSSER, J.
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Prosser's privacy interest torts.9 Since Prosser has had such a
profound effect upon the courts and the legislatures, any privacy
theory which fails to account for his categories is plainly inade-
quate. As demonstrated below, it is necessary to discard the con-
cept of information control in favor of a combination of two inter-
ests: control over stimulus input and control over stimulus output.
In a more complex argument it will be shown that the
autonomy-based school of thought fails to depict the constitu-
tional right to privacy. The reason this portion of the argument
necessarily will be more complex is that the Supreme Court claims
to use an autonomy-based set of criteria in adjudicating constitu-
tional privacy issues. Specifically, the Court has devised a set of
liberties it calls "fundamental," and asserts that the autonomy of
citizens to exercise these cannot be abridged except in extraordi-
nary circumstances. 10 Taking the place of the "fundamental liber-
ties" doctrine in the proposed model of privacy is the notion of
control over self-regarding conduct. Here, the concept of "self-
regarding" actions is, of course, borrowed from John Stuart
Mill,"" and is taken to refer to conduct which affects no one's in-
terests but those of the participants themselves. This model will
be described in great detail, with a discussion of why it more accu-
rately describes the nature of legal privacy than do more tradi-
tional schools of thought.
As previously mentioned, there currently exist two competing
paradigms that strive to explain the nature of claims to a privacy
right. These are the view of privacy as information control and
the view of privacy as personal autonomy. Detailed criticism of
each of the traditional models will be presented in Section II,
which will be followed by arguments in support of an original
model of privacy to be advanced in Section III. The purpose of
WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MAT.RIAIS ON TORTS 1058 (1976).
9. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421 (1980);
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heav)weight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68
COR.NELL L. REv. 291, 365-67 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Note, Roe & Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1166-67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Roe & Paris].
11. J.S. MILL, ON LmiBRTY 13 (A. Castell ed. 1947). Contemporary views of the scope
of self-regarding conduct are the essence of the famed "Hart-Devlin debates." See generally




the following Section is to set forth in a neutral tone the scope of
privacy interests that the two traditional views of privacy claim as
their own domain.
I. CLASSIC NOTIONS OF PRIVACY
Before detailing the new model of privacy advanced in this
Article, it is necessary to assess critically the continued usefulness
of the two more traditional privacy paradigms. This Section will
delineate the purported scope of both the information control
and the autonomy-based views of privacy.
A. Privacy in Torts
The idea that privacy refers to our personal control over the
dissemination of information was foreign to the judiciary much
before the turn of this century. Indeed, it had its birth in an essay
that has remained the singular prominent example of the poten-
tial for the legal academic community to influence courts: Warren
and Brandeis's famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article, "The
Right to Privacy." 2 In this article, the authors argued that private
details about our lives that plainly should not be made available
for public scrutiny are entitled to judicial protection. Warren and
Brandeis contended that the advent of modern technology (espe-
cially instantaneous photography, which made it possible for peo-
ple's pictures to be taken without their cooperation) required the
legislatures to recognize that our "inviolate personalities" were in
danger of being stolen.1 8
The concept that others, particularly the press, should not
have the right to say whatever they please about individuals was
not new; that notion was and remains the essence of a "defama-
tion action. 1 14 What was novel was that while modern defamation
statutes protected against certain kinds of untruths, the right to
privacy would protect against publication of embarrassing truths.1 5
12. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193 (1890). But see Zim-
merman, supra note 9, at 362 (1983): "After ninety years of evolution, the [Warren and
Brandeis] tort has failed to become a usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs."
13. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 205.
14. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877,
922 (1968).
15. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 197.
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Although much had been written in the interim,16 the next
truly significant development in the history of the right to privacy
in tort law was the appearance of William Prosser's 1960 Califor-
nia Law Review essay. 7 Having reviewed hundreds of cases in
which a privacy claim had been made, Prosser argued that there
are actually four separate torts in privacy law. The first category
the article details is the public disclosure tort.1 8 One of the most
frequently cited cases of this variety is Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., 9 in which the publishers of the New Yorker magazine were
sued unsuccessfully by a one-time child prodigy whose eccentric
and reclusive adult lifestyle was depicted in one of the magazine's
regularly featured columns. Although plaintiffs in some other
public disclosure privacy suits have been more successful,2 0 the
United States Supreme Court denied relief in the one case of this
variety it has ever heard. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,"1 the Court
ruled that dissemination of the name of a rape victim was not an
actionable privacy invasion, at least when the name is in the public
court record.
The second category discussed by Prosser, the false light
tort,22 bears similarity to the tort of "libel."' 8 The classification
involves publication of false but not necessarily defamatory state-
ments about individuals. The leading case is Time v. Hill,24 in
16. See, e.g., Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1959);
Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privay, 48 CoLuM. L. REV. 713 (1948); Green,
The Right of Privacy, 27 ILi. L. REv. 237 (1932); Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 18
Ky. L.J. 137 (1931) (presenting a view contra to that taken in Moreland, The Right of Pri-
vacy Today, 19 KY. L.J. 101 (1931)); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MxcH. L. REv. 526
(1948); O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437 (1902); Winfield, Privacy, 47
L.Q. REv. 23 (1931); Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTMi DqAm LAw. 499 (1952).
17. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALI. L. REv. 383 (1960).
18. Id. at 392-98.
19. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
20. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34 (1971), 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, in which a convicted truck hijacker obtained a judgment against the defendant maga-
zine for having used his name in connection with the crime he had commited more than a
decade earlier; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), in which the produc-
ers of the film The Red Kimono were sued by a former prostitute whose correct name was
used in a depiction of a lifestyle she had long-since abandoned.
21. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
22. Prosser, supra note 17, at 398-401.
23. Kalven argues that the two torts are so similar that false lights are ill-conceived.
See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoNTEwM.
PRoas. 326, 340 (1966).
24. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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which Life magazine was sued for publishing Arthur Hill's name in
a story about a new play, The Desperate Hours. The play purport-
edly was based upon the Hill family's ordeal of having been held
hostage in their own home by escaped convicts several years ear-
lier. The "false light" in this case was the story's suggestion that
the Hills had had a rougher time at the hands of the gunmen than
was actually the case. The falsehoods may have been intrusive, but
they were hardly defamatory-indeed, they made it appear that
the family had been extremely courageous. The Supreme Court
refused to uphold damages for Mr. Hill, concluding that whatever
inaccuracies the Life article contained were not made with actual
malice,25 and that the subject was a matter of public interest.28
The third tort contemplated by Prosser, the appropriation
tort, 7 concerns situations in which one person's name and/or
likeness are used without consent for another person's profit. The
earliest case to establish this tort was Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co.,28 wherein an insurance company had made use of
the plaintiff's name and picture, "as well as a spurious testimonial
from him."2 9 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed a lower court
decision to dismiss the plaintiff's privacy claim, admonishing the
judge below that "one who merely for advertising purposes and
from mercenary motives publishes the likeness of another without
his consent cannot be said, in so doing, to have exercised [free-
dom of expression]. "30
The fourth and final of Prosser's privacy torts is intrusion.3 1
It is the only one in which actual dissemination of information is
not necessary for a case to be actionable. 2 All that is required is
that a plaintiff's "personal space" be invaded unduly. In Galella v.
Onassis,"3 for example, a photographer was ordered by the court
literally to keep his distance from Jackie Onassis.
The Warren & Brandeis/Prosser view of privacy is committed
25. Id. at 391-94.
26. Id. at 388.
27. Prosser, supra note 17, at 401-07.
28. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
29. The synopsis is Prosser's. See Prosser, supra note 17, at 386.
30. 122 Ga. at 219, 50 S.E. at 80.
31. Prosser, supra note 17, at 389-92.
32. W. PaossER, LAw OF TORTS § 117, at 807-09, 814 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, The
Emerging Tort of Intrusion, 55 IowA L. REv. 718 (1970).
33. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
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to the concept of privacy as information control." In the next
Section, the scope of the competing view-that privacy is an issue
of autonomy or personal freedom-will be briefly identified. This
will facilitate an analysis of the deficiencies in both traditional
schools of thought. Finally, this explication will be followed by a
discussion of the specific features of the original privacy model
proposed in this Article that may serve to correct those
deficiencies.
B. Privacy in the Constitution
The view of privacy as the freedom to function as autono-
mous agents emerges from an expansive reading of a number of
constitutional principles. 5 Chief among these principles is the
fourth amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.36 Additionally, fifth amendment safeguards against self-
incrimination are sometimes invoked as a facet of autonomy-based
privacy.8 7 It has also been argued that the first amendment guar-
antees of free speech, freedom of and from religion, and freedom
of assembly are essential components of privacy." The argument
here seems to be that if individuals are to truly have a right to
express their beliefs, they must be free from such governmental
activities as surveillance, forced oaths and pledges of allegiance, or
compulsory disclosures of organizational membership lists, all of
which serve to dilute that right.
The watershed decision recognizing this constitutional right
34. See supra note 1. Note, however, that Prosser's intrusion tort does not necessarily
entail the unauthorized dissemination of information. W. PRossER, supra note 32, at 807-
09, 814.
35. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
The word "privacy," of course, does not appear in the United States Constitution. For
some intriguing thoughts on the development of American privacy law inferred from the
experience of privacy protections in those nations which do explicitly recognize a right to
privacy in their constitutions, see Beytagh, Privacy in Perspective: The Experience Under For-
eign Constitutions, 15 U. ToL- L. REv. 449 (1984).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MNN. L. Rxv. 349 (1974).
37. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,




to privacy is Griswold v. Connecticut,9 in which" the Supreme Court
struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contracep-
tive devices. The constitutional right to privacy enunciated in
Griswold has been seen as a right to "personal lifestyles,"'40 "inti-
mate association," 41 "personal liberty," 42 and, more generally,
" 'autonomy.43
The Supreme Court attempted in Griswold and in later pri-
vacy cases to provide a general framework for detailing the scope
of privacy interests. One of the themes of this Article, however, is
that this framework has led to controversy and inconsistency. In
the next section reasons for discarding both the information con-
trol view of privacy and the Supreme Court's suggested tests for
determining the scope of protected privacy interests are set forth.
II. FAILINGS OF THE TRADITIONAL MODELS OF PRIVACY
In this Section, the specific weaknesses of the two currently
accepted views of claims to a privacy right-privacy as informa-
tion control and privacy as autonomy-are identified. After these
deficiencies are set forth, the Article identifies ways in which the
proposed privacy model seeks to remedy them.
A. Alan Westin and the Information Control Conceptualizations
Alan Westin's work is so automatically associated with infor-
mation control views of privacy that it is only proper to begin this
Section with his classic definition of privacy: "the claim of individ-
uals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others.""
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. See Wilkinson & White, supra note 2.
41. See Karst, supra note 3.
42. See Note, On Privacy, supra note 4.
43. See Eichbaum, supra note 2.
44. A. WEsTwin, supra note 1, at 7. Among those who have adopted Westin's definition
or some modification of it are A. Miu.mtE, supra note 1, at 25; Friedrich, Secrecy v. Privacy:
The Democratic Dilemma, in PRivAcY, supra note 1, at 105; Gross, supra note 1; Derlega &
Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Relationships, 33 J. oF Soc. Iss. 102 (1977);
Fried, Privacy, 77 YAL.E L.J. 475, 482 (1968); Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy,
31 LAW & CowErmp. Paoas. 307 (1966); Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A
Professor's View, 44 MiNN. L. REv. 891 (1960); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV.
393 (1978); Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 4; Reiman, supra note 4, at 33; Shils, Privacy: Its
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Since Prosser's four privacy torts are, in essence, the tort law
of privacy where it exists, one way of gauging the value of "infor-
mation control" definitions of privacy is to determine which, if
any, of Prosser's torts are information control violations. Surely
the public disclosure tort, in which the transgressor publishes true
but embarrassing facts about the plaintiff, directly concerns con-
trol over information.
False light invasions of privacy would differ from disclosure
torts in this respect. The key question becomes, what is meant by
"information"? If by definition information must consist only of
truths, then false light invasions of privacy are impossible.4 5 Simi-
larly, Prosser's "appropriation" tort does not mesh well with Wes-
tin's definition. As a number of critics have pointed out, the ap-
propriation tort is really two interests combined.4 6 First, there is
the property interest in being paid at the going rate for the use of
one's name or likeness. The existence of such a property claim is
not at all implied by a phrase such as "information control. '47 Ap-
propriation cases, however, also can involve a damaged reputa-
tion. The notion here is that if the public does "learn" anything
about the exploited individual, it is that he or she endorses the
product advertised. Depending upon the nature of the product (or
the hypersensitivity of the plaintiff, for that matter), this may itself
be defamatory. Appropriation thus involves either no information
at all (pure commercialization) or only misinformation (erroneous
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & Cowrwn,. PROBs. 281 (1966); Rachels, Why Privacy Is
Important, 4 PHmos. & PuB. An'. 323 (1975); Warren & Laslett, Privacy and Secrecy: A Concep-
tual Comparison, 33 J. oF Soc. Iss. 43, 44 (1977); Webb, Privacy and Psychosomatic Stress: An
Empirical Analysis, 6 Soc. BEll. & Paas. 227 (1979); Siegel, supra note 1, at 251. For argu-
ments to the effect that Westin's definition is inadequate, see Weinstein, The Private and the
Free: A Conceptual Inquiry, in PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 27; Gavison, supra note 9, at 423;
Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 693 (1973); and
especially Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RurrGaas L. REV. 275 (1974).
45. See Kalven, supra note 23, at 340; but see Lusky, supra note 44, at 696-97.
46. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 16, at 722; Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the
Portayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YAi L.J. 1577, 1599-1601 (1979); Gerety, supra
note 4; Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNrTEM. PRODS. 203, 207 (1954); Wig-
more, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Utterance, Ky. L.J. May 1916, at 3; Win-
field, Privacy, 47 L.Q. REv. 23 (1931); Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive
Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 722 (1963); Note, The Right of
Publich-Protectionfor Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BRooKLYN L. Rxv. 527 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Note, The Right of Publidty].
47. See Groucho Marx Publications v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.




Prosser's final privacy tort is intrusion. Whether this tort
would fit with Westinian thought depends upon why the intrusion
is undertaken in the first place. A claim of intrusion, however, re-
quires neither the publishing nor even the seeking of unautho-
rized information. 48 The tort is conceived more properly as a per-
sonal trespass. 49  Intrusions are nuisances-invasions of our
personal space. It is highly questionable whether photographer
Ron Galella seeks "information" about his subjects. A picture of
Jackie Onassis doing anything (or nothing at all) is a marketable
commodity; it need not impart "information."50
It is apparent that a reliance upon Westin's notion of privacy
as "information control" would preclude us from handling as
many as three of Prosser's four privacy torts. To this list may be
added situations in which one's daily functioning is interrupted by
unwelcome stimuli. These situations are encapsulated neatly in
Haiman's phrase: "the right not to be spoken to." 1 Westin can-
not deal with these situations (soundtrucks, residential picketing,
telephone solicitations, etc.) for at least two reasons. First, not
every such stimulus imparts "information" as such. The sound-
truck may, in fact, be most annoying when it is perceived as high-
decibel static. Second, this set of situations surely does not con-
cern the imparting of information about us, to others.
There is, however, a long history of case law which arguably
does concern such imparting of information, yet which has not
been discussed within Westin's definition. Consider the huge and
ever-growing body of fourth amendment "search and seizure"
cases.5 2 The reason exploration of this branch of privacy has been
delayed is not that Westin's definition cannot cover it, but because
48. Comment, The Emergent Tort of Intrusion, 55 IowA L. Ray. 718, 719 (1970).
49. W. PRossm, supra note 32, at 807.
50. Indeed, in Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973), Judge Timbers spent
most of his opinion determining how many feet away from his subject Galella would have
to stand in the future, and virtually ignored the information control aspects of the situa-
tion. As long as Mr. Galella did his work from a healthy distance (presumably with the aid
of sophisticated telephoto lenses), he would not be guilty of "intrusion" upon Ms. Onassis's
privacy.
51. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv.
153 (1972).
52. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rv.
349 (1974); Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U.
TOL L. REv. 515 (1984).
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it typically has not been called upon by the courts to cover it.
Courts generally do not focus upon the nature of information
gathered by such searches but rather upon whether a genuine in-
trusion into the constitutionally protected confines of the home or
of the person has occurred. 53 To the extent that the methods
used, and not the fruits harvested, have commanded the courts'
attention, Westin's definition is inapplicable. Moreover, Westin's
definition is inadequate to cope with searches conducted primarily
to harass, rather than to obtain information.
With all this in mind, it is clear that the information control
school of thought will have to be expanded somewhat if it is to
produce a workable diagram of life situations that are viewed as
privacy concerns. Before presenting such an expansion, the fol-
lowing Section reviews contemporary developments in the com-
peting, autonomy-based view of privacy.
B. Autonomy-based Conceptualizations
The autonomy-based constitutional right to privacy, although
first explicitly enunciated in Griswold, had been in existence in
scattered form for quite some time before that 1965 decision.
Typically, when privacy interests were argued, the first, fourth,
fifth and/or fourteenth amendments were at issue. First amend-
ment privacy cases traditionally focus upon the freedom of associ-
ation,5 the freedom not to speak, 55 or the freedom to speak anon-
ymously.56 Fourth amendment privacy cases typically deal with
53. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 52; Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing
after Rakas v. Illinois: From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEW ENG. L. Rav. 197 (1981).
Quite recently, however, the Supreme Court dramatically reversed this trend. In Nix v.
Williams, 52 U.S.L.W. 4731 (1984), the majority explicitly sanctioned the "inevitable dis-
covery" exception to the exclusionary rule, which previously had barred the use of all evi-
dence obtained illegally or in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. See infra note
57. Under Nix, such evidence will be admissible if the prosecution can show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it would have been obtained regardless of the illegal or viola-
tive activity. Thus, the nature of the information gathered (i.e., information that probably
would have been discovered anyway) seems more important to the Court than the methods
used to gather the information.
54. See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J.
1 (1964); Karst, supra note 3; Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HAxv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977); Comment, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Assod-
ation and Right to Privacy, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1181.
55. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see generally D.
MANWAIRNG, RENDER Uro CAsAR (1962).
56. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
1984]
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criminal prosecutions in which questionable police procedures are
alleged. On the other hand, fifth amendment concerns tend to be
even narrower, wherein defendants claim the right not to incrimi-
nate themselves by their own testimony.sv
Fourteenth amendment privacy decisions have had a resur-
gence in recent years. 8 For several decades the Supreme Court
had been reluctant to adopt the fourteenth amendment's guaran-
tee of "substantive due process" in formulating decisions. Al-
though a thorough history of the substantive due process doctrine
is beyond the scope of this Article,59 some appreciation of the is-
sues involved is necessary. It is no exaggeration to say that by ap-
plying the doctrine too readily in scores of cases around the turn
of the century, the Court opened itself up to charges of function-
ing as a "superlegislature," imposing the whim of the justices
upon the will of the people (as expressed in the work of their
elected officials). 60 Since the 1930's, however, the Court has been
very careful when striking down a state law to demonstrate that
the statute grossly offended a specific constitutional provision, not
449 (1958). See generally DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a
Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 161 (1972);
Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure, and The Devil, 70 YA.LE L.J.
1084 (1961).
57. Fourth and fifth amendment issues are often merged in a single case, usually in
situations in which the evidence, indeed, "speaks for itself." If we have a right not to in-
criminate ourselves by use of our vocal cords, we might also have the right not to be in-
criminated by our possessions, if these were improperly taken from us. This relationship is
formalized, of course, in the judicially developed prohibition of the use by prosecutors of
evidence obtained illegally or in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights (the exclu-
sionary rule). This relationship is formalized of course, in the "exclusionary rule" of crimi-
nal procedure, which originated in the Supreme Court cases of Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) (regarding federal action), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(regarding state action). But see Nix v. Williams, 52 U.S.L.W. 4731 (1984) (discussed supra
note 53).
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) is a significant example. See generally Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAuE L.J. 920, 937-39 (1973).
59. Such history is well documented; See generally Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sui. CT. Rxv. 232, 246; Craven, supra note 4, at 704; Ely,
supra note 58, at 920; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 703
(1975); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1416 (1974); Rehnquist,
supra note 1; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAV. L. REv. 1
(1959); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 223 (1973); Note, On Privacy, supra note 4, at 672; Note, Roe &
Paris, supra note 10.
60. See, e.g., Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I
(1915); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
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that it just deprived citizens of a "liberty" not specifically enunci-
ated in the Constitution. 1
One of the chief controversies surrounding the Griswold deci-
sion was whether Justice Douglas's attempt to find a right to pri-
vacy "emanating" from the first, third, fourth and other amend-
ments was credible, or whether what he was actually doing was
invoking the substantive due process doctrine without admitting
it. Indeed, despite the fact that Douglas wrote the opinion of the
Court, a majority of the justices who wrote or joined in concur-
ring opinions seemed ready to admit that substantive due process
had reemerged. 2 Furthermore, in cases decided after Griswold,
the Court is more forthrightly invoking the substantive due pro-
cess doctrine. 8
The Court's justification seems to be that there are actually
two kinds of liberties guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment:
those that are "fundamental" and those that are not. Laws which
infringe upon these "fundamental" liberties must serve a "com-
pelling" state interest, and must thus survive a standard of "strict
scrutiny" if they are to be upheld.6 Perhaps the most explicit at-
tempt to define the scope of fundamental liberties appears in Jus-
tice Goldberg's Griswold concurrence: fundamental rights are
those which "cannot be denied without violating those fundamen-
"685tal principles of liberty and justice ....
The Court is not alone in its struggle to set forth the scope of
fundamental liberties. Wilkinson and White argue that they are
61. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963).
62. 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, Warren and Brennan, JJ., concurring); id. at 500
(Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
63. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as wefeel it is, or,
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amemdment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy.
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (emphasis added). But, as Beytagh correctly points out, it is not at
all clear to whom the "we" in Roe refers; some of the justices who adhered to the Douglas
"emanations" theory of privacy from Griswold were now part of the Roe majority. Beytagh,
supra note 35, at 457.
Additional support for the proposition that the fourteenth amendment is the source of
privacy protection is found in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct.
2481 (1983).
64. See Note, Roe & Paris, supra note 10, at 1167.
65. 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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"the most personal aspect[s]" 6 of our lives which merit protec-
tion. Thomas Gerety writes of "the intimacies of personal iden-
tity."18 7 However, none of these attempts adequately defines "fun-
damental liberties." Perhaps Henkin best illuminates the problems
involved when he writes:
We are not told the basis . . . for concluding that "liberty" includes some
individual autonomy that is "fundamental" and much that is not. . . . We
are not told why Privacy satisfies this test (unless Privacy is a tautology for
fundamentality).
The zone of privacy, we are told, includes rights that are "personal,"
"fundamental," "essential to ordered liberty," but if these apparently aspire
to some kind of justification, they hardly provide definition . . ..
The privacy model offered here discards the troublesome "funda-
mental liberties" doctrine in favor of "control over self-regarding
conduct." '69
Justification for this change consists in part of comparisons of
Supreme Court opinions involving the same fundamental liberty,
yet producing opposite results. 0 It will be further shown that
66. Wilkinson & White, supra note 2, at 564.
67. Gerety, supra note 4, at 236.
68. Henkin, supra note 37, at 1426. See also Dronenburg v. Zech, No. 82-2304, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1984), in which Judge Bork wrote:
When the Supreme Court decides cases under a specific provision or amend-
ment to the Constitution it explicates the meaning and suggests the contours of
a value already stated in the document or implied by the Constitution's struc-
ture and history. The lower court judge finds in the Supreme Court's reasoning
about those legal materials, as well as in the materials themselves, guidance for
applying the provision or amendment to a new situation. But when the Court
creates new rights, as some Justices who have engaged in the process state that
they have done, see, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring),
lower courts have none of these materials available and can look only to what
the Supreme Court has stated to be the principal involved.
Id. at 15-16.
Judge Bork also indicates his disfavor with the Griswold rationale in its entirety when he
describes as "unexceptional" Justice Douglas's proposition that certain provisions of the
Bill of Rights have penumbras that emanate from them. "It was not explained how areas
not lying within any 'penumbra' or 'zone of privacy' became part of a more general 'right
of privacy,' but clearly that is what the Court intended." Id. at 10.
69. The self-regarding conduct construct, borrowed from John Stuart Mill, refers to
actions that affect only the participants and are therefore none of society's business. See
generally J.S. MmL, supra note 10.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 164-94.
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even Roe v. Wade 1 in which Justice Blackmun explicitly found the
right to privacy to be a "fundamental liberty" guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment, 2 can be better explained in terms of con-
trol over self-regarding conduct. Finally, it will be asserted that
the very process of defining the scope of fundamental liberties is
inconsistent with the countermajoritarian tradition of our consti-
tutional form of government.
III. A NEw MODEL OF PRIVACY CLAIMS
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the variety of circum-
stances in which privacy arguments have been made is tremen-
dous, and these arguments have implicated myriad interests and
alleged harms. This Article now proposes a new model of privacy
which, arguably, can accurately depict this broad spectrum. The
model is composed of three categories: control over stimulus in-
put, control over stimulus output, and control over self-regarding
conduct.
A. Control Over Stimulus Input
The first category, control over stimulus input, involves the
injured party's privacy interest in keeping out certain kinds of
stimuli. This refers to stimuli, not information, because courts
typically have not been concerned with whether the stimulus at
issue carried linguistic content.7 3 Further, privacy claims based ei-
ther on a wish to exclude certain intrusions (a loud telephone
ring, for example) or a desire to be free from particular messages
(such as solicitations for contributions) would be included in this
category.
In the constitutional law of searches and seizures, the rule
courts apply to determine when intrusions are justified concerns
the intruded-upon person's "reasonable expectation of privacy." 74
This standard, which has its origin in Justice Harlan's concurring
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. Id. at 153.
73. See, e.g., P.U.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Kaplan, Commerical Speech and the
Right to Privacy: Constitutional Implications of Regulating Unsolicited Phone Calls, 15 COLUM. J.
L. & Soc. PnoBs. 277 (1980). See also Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981).
74. U.S. v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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opinion in United States v. Katz, 75 has had a tremendous impact on
both constitutional and tort law. Harlan set forth the following
test in Katz:
[T]here is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are
not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited.78
A corollary of the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine
is that of "assumed risk."'7 7 The argument here is that by acting in
certain ways, individuals effectively relinquish their option of later
claiming that their privacy was invaded. In Olmstead v. United
States,78 for example, the Court felt that appellant's simple act of
speaking on the phone assumed a risk that his words would be
recorded by government agents. By projecting his words beyond
the confines of his private domain, appellant took a chance that
the same words would be projected still further. Katz, of course,
effectively overruled Olmstead and even held that the user of a
public phone booth does not necessarily assume a risk of being
"tapped. '7 9
Later cases have established the general rule that the govern-
ment may use "wired informants" to monitor and record conver-
sations with suspects.80 The reasoning in those opinions is that
one must take the risk of betrayal when he confides to another the
details of his criminal wrongdoing. A possible problem with this
line of cases is the failure to notice that the government is not
75. Id.
76. Id. Compare Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), with New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454 (1981), concerning the "plain view" requirement. For critical commentary
upon the Katz test generally, see Siegel, supra note 38, at 86-87 and sources cited therein.
77. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 406-09; Note, Drawing Lines Around the
Fourth Amendment: Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton, 10 HOFsTRA L. Rxv. 483
(1982).
78. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (concerning
the expectation of privacy one has in regularly dialed telephone numbers); State v. How-
ard, No. 55,963 (Kan. Mar. 24, 1984) (holding that people enjoy no expectation of privacy
in conversations conducted on wireless telephones).
79. 389 U.S. at 352-53.
80. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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merely hoping a suspect will be betrayed; it is actively attempting
to ensure that this will happen:
The fact that our ordinary social intercourse. . . imposes certain risks upon
us hardly means that government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding
to those risks. Every person who parks his or her car on a side street in
Greenwich Village voluntarily runs the risk that it will be burglarized ....
Does this mean that government agents can break into your parked car
.... Or pay the junkies to break into it?8 1
This same problem applies to intrusions that are completely
unrelated to criminal law. Some case law has indicated that people
should not expect to enjoy a great deal of freedom from intrusion
while in public. The rationale seems to be that once people leave
the safety and tranquility of their homes, for example, they as-
sume a risk of confronting unwelcome stimuli. This appears to be
the Court's reasoning, at least in part, in P.U.C. v. Pollak.82 Pollak
upheld the right of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority to play music and advertisements on public
buses, despite the fact that some people found the practice annoy-
ing. Charles Black's dismay over the decision prompted him to
write:
[I]t is pointed out that a good deal of noise, verbal and nonverbal, is inescap-
ably incidental to city life, and that this, after all, is just one noise more
.... What would we think of a man who turned a hose on passers-by, and
defended his action on the ground that people in those parts were often
caught in the rain?83
The Court's ruling in Pollak relied heavily upon the notion
that we assume a risk of being bombarded with unwelcome stimuli
when out in public. The same reasoning was crucial to the deci-
sion in Cohen v. California." Paul Cohen was arrested on disor-
derly conduct charges for walking through the Los Angeles
County Courthouse wearing a denim jacket with the words
"FUCK THE DRAFT" embroidered on it. The Court, in over-
turning Cohen's conviction, rejected the state's argument that
81. Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 406-07; see also Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S.
1045 (1981).
82. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
83. Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 960, 970 (1953).
84. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). But see Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor




passersby in the courthouse constituted a "captive audience"
whose sensibilities should be respected. The Court's counter-
argument was two-fold: (1) individuals assume the risk of con-
fronting offensive communications whenever they move about in
public; and (2) those who were offended by Cohen's attire could
have simply "avert[ed] their eyes" to avoid continued offense."5
It should be pointed out that the amount of freedom from
intrusion that should be enjoyed even in the home is by no means
a settled issue. In FCC v. Pacifica,"' for example, the fact that a
person can effortlessly tune out offensive messages on the airwaves
did not preclude the government from censuring a radio station
that transmitted such messages. Similarly, although it seems to be
a simple matter to discard "junk mail,"87 the government takes
the affirmative step of permitting citizens to have their names re-
moved from any commercial mailing list simply by alerting the
Post Office that they view particular literature as obscene. This
procedure was upheld in Rowan v. United States Post Office."' In less
than two years after Rowan the Post Office had received almost
400,000 requests to prohibit mailings from such "pornographers"
as La Salle Extension University, and of such "pornography" as
Roget's Thesaurus and the Family Heritage Bible."' There is also
a movement afoot to produce a Rowan-type provision for people
who do not want to receive "junk" phone calls, especially when
placed by automatic computerized dialing machines."
Another intrusion issue where judicial attitude is somewhat
unclear is that of residential picketing. This uncertainty owes
largely to the particular facts of the cases that have come before
the courts. Generally, the courts have upheld narrowly drawn stat-
utes prohibiting this particular brand of unwelcome stimuli. 1
However, cases often are complicated by equal protection issues.
In Carey v. Brown, for example, the Supreme Court struck down a
85. 403 U.S. at 21.
86. 438 U.S. 726, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
87. Haiman, supra note 51, at 180.
88. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
89. Lowman, Federal Pandering Advertisements Statute: The Right ofPrivacy Versus the First
Amendment, 32 Omo ST. L.J. 149, 154-55 (1971).
90. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 73; Luten, Give Me a Home Where No Salesmen Phone:
Telephone Solicitation and the First Amendment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129 (1979).




statute on the grounds that it granted an exception for labor pick-
eting.92 Although granting that the state's interest in protecting
the privacy of the home is legitimate, the particular statute at is-
sue was struck down in that "even the most legitimate goal may
not be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner."93
The Illinois residential picketing statute was deemed unconstitu-
tional in that it reached Brown's conduct-peacefully picketing in
Mayor Daley's neighborhood to protest the Mayor's anti-busing
stand-but explicitly excepted equally peaceful picketing resulting
from labor disputes."
Interestingly, the law on door-to-door solicitations, unlike the
above home intrusions, makes a clear distinction on the basis of
the content of the message conveyed. Political and religious
messages are permitted unless the homeowner takes the affirma-
tive step of proclaiming that he or she does not welcome solicitors
(by posting a NO SOLICITORS sign, for example).95 However, if
the message is predominantly commercial, muncipalities are free
to regulate or even prohibit door-to-door solicitation, despite the
fact that many residents might want to hear such messages."
Taken together, the search and seizure cases from criminal
law and the "home as castle" civil cases seem to be establishing
the following test: the behavior of a person intruded upon displays
a certain degree of risk assumption, and it is this assumption of
risk which determines what kinds of unwanted stimulus input will
be tolerated. If we go out in public, we are subject to more and
different stimuli than we are if we remain at home. If we trust a
confidant, we open ourselves up to government-inspired betrayal.
No discussion of the claim to be free from noxious stimulus
input would be complete without consideration of some of the
ethical issues involved in social science research. Here, too, the
belief seems to be that experimental subjects assume a certain risk
by engaging in some kinds of behavior. Specifically, it is assumed
that subjects who voluntarily partake in an experiment assume a
risk that those who are unobtrusively and unknowingly observed
92. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
93. Id. at 463-65.
94. Id. at 457, 462.
95. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1942).
96. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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in field research do not assume.
In regard to the latter kind of social science inquiry, a consid-
erable uproar resulted from a study of urinating behavior in a
public lavatory conducted a few years ago by R. Dennis Middlmist
and his colleagues.9 The research question dealt with how the
presence of another person, and the distance between the subject
and that other person, would affect the time it took the subject to
begin urinating ("micturition delay") and the duration of the uri-
nation itself ("micturition persistence").98 The two "intruders" in
this experiment were a confederate, who positioned himself either
one or two urinals away from the subject, and an observer, who
used a periscopic prism to view the "lower torso" of the subject
(as well as the flow of urine) and to help the confederate accu-
rately start and stop a timer to gauge the dependent measures.
Upon reading the report of the experiment, Gerald Koocher was
outraged, which led him to conclude: "Though one could claim
that a college lavatory is a public place, it is a non sequitur to
suggest that one does not expect a degree of privacy there."**
Even with experimental-as opposed to field-research,
there may be tremendous ethical problems with respect to stimu-
lus input control. Apart from the obvious concerns surrounding
electric shocks or other physically painful manipulations, innumer-
able experiments employ procedures specifically geared to ad-
versely affect subjects' self-images or to create psychologically
stressful emotions.100 Moreover, the gnawing problem of the pos-
97. Middlmist, Knowles & Matter, Personal Space Invasions in the Lavatory: Suggestive
Evidence for Arousal, 33 J. PEas. & Soc. Psy. 541 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Middlmist]. See
also Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 981
(1966).
98. Middlmist, supra note 97, at 543-44.
99. Koocher, Bathroom Behavior and Human Dignity, 35 J. PEas. & Soc. Psy. 120 (1977).
The writer also takes the editors to task for publishing the report, thus "rewarding" the
experimenters. The reasoning here is strikingly similar to that used in claiming, in the
legal context, that the exclusionary rule serves as a deterrent to privacy invasions.
Justice Stevens has suggested that police misconduct can often be deterred even as a
result of unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence. The particular officers involved in
questionable practices will, according to Justice Stevens, be held accountable-at least in
the public's mind, if not tangibly-for the enormous state expenditures resulting from the
litigation of such matters. Nix v. Williams, 52 U.S.L.W. 4732, 4739 (1984) (concurring
opinion).
100. See, e.g., Abelson & Miller, Negative Persuasion Via Personal Insult, 3 J. EXPER. Soc.
PsY. 321 (1967); Farr & Seaver, Stress and Discomfort in Psychological Research, 30 AM. Psy.
770 (1975); Gergen, The Codification of Research Ethics, 28 AM. Psy. 907 (1973); Piliavan &
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sibly negative effects of the experimental findings themselves,
apart from the procedures, must be considered. Before con-
ducting his now-classic experiments on obedience, Stanley Mil-
gram wrote to mental health professionals around the country
asking them to predict what proportion of experimental subjects
would "go all the way," ostensibly administering a shock of over
four hundred volts to another person. Psychiatrists guessed that
only one in one thousand subjects would behave this way.1°1 As is
now well known, the psychiatrists were wrong. In some experi-
mental designs, as many as sixty-five percent of subjects adminis-
tered what they thought to be 450 volts or more.0 2
Milgram's findings created tremendous controversy in the so-
cial science community. The crucial point for the immediate argu-
ment is that this controversy concerned those findings themselves
more than it did the experimental design employed.0 In other
words, from a privacy law perspective, the controversy centered
around whether Milgram's subjects had a right not to learn un-
pleasant things about themselves.
This review of issues raised within the control over stimulus
input category of the proposed model demonstrates the superior-
ity of this model over more traditional "information control" con-
cepts of privacy. Indeed, the only kinds of privacy invasions dis-
cussed in this Section which fit comfortably within information
control theories are those in which complainants wish not to be
spoken to. The moment the intrusion approximates mere noise
rather than information, a broader construct-such as stimulus
input-must be invoked. Moreover, any information-seeking in-
trusions upon one's personal space, whether physical (as in the lav-
atory experiments) or electronic-as in wiretapping or using "pen
Piliavan, Effect of Blood on Reactions to a Victim, 23 J. PERs. & Soc. Psy. 353 (1972); see gener-
ally H. SCHULER, EThicAL PROBLEMS IN PsycOLoGicAL RESEARCH 75-98 (1982).
101. S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO Autonrry 31 (1974).
102. Id.
103. Milgram, Issues in the Study of Obedience: A Reply to Baumrind, 19 Am. Psy. 848,
849-50 (1964). For an argument to the effect that stimulus input privacy is a consideration
that involves not only experimental or survey subjects, but also the larger public that might
hear about potentially damaging findings, see Delgado, Bradley, Burkewood, Chavez,
Doering, Lardiere, Reeves, Smith & Windhansen, Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional
Validity of Governmental Restrictions on Race-I.Q. Research, 31 UCLA L. REv. 128, 180-94
(1984). For a discussion of stimulus output privacy concerns of research subjects in a medi-
cal context, see Brown, Free Press, Privacy and Privilege: Protection of Researcher-Subject Com-
munications, 17 GA. L. REv. 1009, 1026-48 (1983).
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registers"1lG0-are surely unwanted stimulus inputs, even though
they do not impart "information" to the unwilling recipients.
Also apparent from this discussion is the fact that the same
circumstances can produce both stimulus input and stimulus out-
put concerns. A "bug," for example, is an electronic intrusion
into one's personal space (stimulus input) designed to gather infor-
mation about him (stimulus output). This latter category will now
be addressed.
B. Control Over Stimulus Output
As was true of the control over stimulus input category,
claims to control over stimulus output also warrant an analysis of
both constitutional and tort issues. The fifth amendment's protec-
tion from self-incrimination is the primary constitutional concern
in this category. The more general first amendment corol-
lary-giving people the right not to speak-as enunciated in the
compulsory disclosure, 05 freedom of association,10 6 anonymous
speech,107 and freedom from religion 0 8 cases is also relevant here.
Moreover, the relationship between the two varieties of constitu-
tional claims should be apparent. As Robert McKay suggests:
The first amendment notion that no man may be compelled to worship or to
speak in any particular way-or at all-may be regarded as an enlarged ver-
sion of the more specific fifth amendment notion that no man shall be re-
quired to convict himself out of his own mouth.'"
With regard to torts, Prosser's public disclosure and false
light categories are subsumed here, as is defamation. The fact that
false light and libel are included again reflects the concern with
the wider scope of stimulus, as opposed to information, control. It
thus need not be determined whether such information, by defini-
tion, can be false. In addition, the appropriation cases-what
some have called "right to publicity" cases-are also of interest,
again indicating the disinterest with whether "information" as
104. Whereas a phone "bug" records actual conversations, a pen register provides the
investigator with a record of telephone numbers dialed from the object phone. See Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
106. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
107. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
108. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
109. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 212.
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such is conveyed in the process of stimulus output.
The constitutional issues of stimulus output control posed by
the fifth amendment provide a good starting point for analysis. As
the Supreme Court has noted, issues arising under the fourth
amendment (search and seizure) and the fifth amendment (self-
incrimination) "run almost into each other."110 Invoking the ex-
clusionary rule is, of course, the essence of the institutionalized
joining of the two amendments.
The fifth amendment provision against self-incrimination,
however, does not require any fourth amendment elements to be
activated. Indeed, the fifth amendment is the amendment most di-
rectly related to pure output control.""1 It protects us from being
''a witness against" ourselves. Yet the wording does not make
clear whether this means only that we cannot be compelled to
take the witness stand and condemn ourselves by our own speech.
A more liberal construction might encompass any means by which
our persons or possessions might "bear witness" against us.
This interpretation issue was squarely posed one hundred
years ago in Boyd v. United States," 2 in which an alleged tax evader
was compelled to produce personal and financial papers for the
state's review. The Court ruled that the fifth amendment was
clearly implicated, even though no actual oral testimony was com-
pelled: "[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's testi-
mony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of crime" was deemed to activate fifth amendment protection
over stimulus output.1 8 The Court went still further: "We have
been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially dif-
ferent from compelling him to be a witness against himself."
' 114
Recently, however, there has been a judicial move toward a more
literal interpretation of the phrase to be a "witness" against one-
self. Thus, the Court has upheld the compulsory stimulus output
of voice samples," 5 police lineups,
e6 handwriting samples,117
110. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
111. D. O'BliUN, PmVACY, LAw AND PuBLIc Poucy 95 (1978); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 878 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
112. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
113. Id. at 632.
114. Id. at 633.
115. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
116. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
117. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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blood samples,"' and personal finance 19 and tax 120 records. In so
doing, the Court has effectively overruled the Boyd decision. A re-
cent example of this appears in Andresen v. Maryland,21 where the
Court made clear that properly seized personal papers may be
used to "testify" against defendants:
Petitioner was not asked to say or do anything. The records seized contained
statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search
and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel.
Finally, when these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated
by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to
speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to
unfavorable evidence, was not present. 15 2
Another issue related to just how literally the Court inter-
prets the fifth amendment focuses on the reference to self in the
phrase "self-incrimination." In a highly technological society such
as ours, considerable information about us is readily available
from various professionals, such as accountants, bankers and law-
yers. The dilemma lies in the fact that, while we rely on these
professionals for confidentiality, such professionals can be com-
pelled to use documents that are, at least in a sense, "ours" (tax
returns, cancelled checks, and the like) to bear witness against us.
The documents would only be protected if they fell under a spe-
cific legal evidentiary privilege.1 28
Before shifting the analysis away from the fifth amendment
self-incrimination protections, reference should be made to the
Court's having acknowledged, as early as 1941, that the impetus
behind these protections is not solely the desire to avoid obtaining
false confessions through coercion. In Lisenba v. California,1 24 the
Court held that the fifth amendment's self-incrimination and due
process language taken together is meant "not to exclude pre-
sumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness
118. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
119. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
120. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973).
121. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
122. 427 U.S. at 473.
123. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
124. 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
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in the use of evidence, whether true or false." '125
The Lisenba ruling provides further support for focusing
upon stimulus output, and not merely upon information output.
The truth or falsity of a confession is irrelevant. What is relevant
is that certain means of producing stimulus output are forbidden
because they are themselves intolerable in a free society.
Another area in which the Constitution deals directly with
the control of stimulus output is in the corollary first amendment
right not to speak-a right not to be forced "to utter what is not
in [one's] mind." 126 Several noteworthy recent cases in which
"right not to speak" arguments are raised concern the public use
of privately owned public spaces including airports and shopping
centers. The owners of such places, when confronted with de-
mands by political and religious groups that the property be made
available for disseminating literature and other information, ar-
gue that they are being forced to utter what is not in their
minds.
12 7
The owners' argument seems to be that the public will as-
sume that they, and not the political or religious groups them-
selves, are speaking. The Supreme Court, however, has never ac-
125. Id. But see U.S. v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155, (1984), in which Justice White, writ-
ing for the majority, asserted that the exclusionary rule is not a "necessary corollary of the
Fourth Amendment" and that it is not "required by the conjunction of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments." Id. at 5157. Justice White concluded that the practice of letting guilty
people to go free as a result of the zealous application of the exclusionary rule,
"[p]articularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their
transgressions have been minor," violates "basic concepts of the criminal justice system."
Id. at 5157-58.
126. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943) (right not
to salute flag); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (right not to display state
motto on automobile license plate).
127. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Laguna
Publ. Co. v. Golden West Publ. Corp., 110 Cal. App. 3d 43, 167 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1980),
reh'g granted sub nom. Laguna Publ. Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 131 Cal.
App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1170 (1983); Cologne
v. Westfarms Assocs., 37 Conn. Supp. 90, 442 A.2d 471 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hood,
389 Mass. 581, 452 N.E.2d 188 (1983); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83, 445
N.E.2d 590 (1983); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens' Lobby, 128 Mich. App. 649, 341
N.W.2d 174 (1983), leave to appeal granted Feb. 29, 1984; Commodities Export Co. v. City
of Detroit, 116 N.W.2d 842 (1982); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Shad Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall, 118 Misc. 2d 841, 462 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1983); Whitby Operating Co. v.
Schleissner, 117 Misc. 2d 794, 459 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1982); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173,
273 S.E.2d 708 (1981); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981); Al-
derwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cepted such a theory in this context. In Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins,1"3 a pro-Zionist group wanted to engage in leafletting
and speech-making on the grounds of a privately owned shopping
center. While the actual holding in the case focused upon the
state of California's right to give its citizens access to such forums
even where no parallel federal right exists,129 Justice Rehnquist
did explicitly respond to the property owner's contention that he
was being forced to speak. Drawing upon the facts of a similar
case, Wooley v. Maynard,130 in which appellant had refused to dis-
play the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die," on his
automobile license plate, Rehnquist said:
Wooley ... was a case in which the government itself prescribed the mes-
sage.. . . Here, by contrast, there are a number of distinguishing factors.
Most important, the shopping center ... is not limited to the personal use
of the appellants. It is instead a business establishment that is open to the
public to come and go as they please. The views expressed by members of
the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus
will not likely be identified with those of the owner.. . . There consequently
is no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular mes-
sage. Finally, as far as appears here appellants can expressly disavow any con-
nection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the
speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any
sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are communi-
cating their own messages by virtue of state law.13
Most of the right-not-to-speak cases involve what might be
called more "hybrid" or "derivative" circumstances than those in
Wooley. Included among these are the anonymous speech cases, 18 2
the membership list cases,133 and the cases involving forced dis-
closure of associational ties.'u In these cases, litigants argue not so
128. 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
129. Id. at 80-81 (distinguishing Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
130. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
131. 447 U.S. at 87. See also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 604 (1981) (upholding rule requiring group to restrict solicitation to fixed location at
state fair).
132. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (city ordinance prohibiting dis-
tribution of handbills without name and address of preparers, distributors and sponsors on
its face held unconstitutional).
133. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (state court order for production
of membership lists held unconstitutional).
134. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down statute requiring




much that their right to silence is simply the obverse side of their
right to speak-and protectable because it furthers their self-ful-
fillment (among other things)-but that dire consequences will re-
sult if they are forced to speak. 3 5 Generally, these feared "dire
consequences" in the kinds of cases cited above involve actions
that other people will presumably take. A potential employer will
not hire us; a current employer will fire us. People who are vehe-
mently opposed to our political views will attack us; conversely,
those who might otherwise join us will be reticent if they know
that they will be exposed.
The recent case of H.L. v. Matheson38 finds a petitioner im-
plicitly arguing that she herself will not act in her best interests if
forced to speak. At issue was a Utah statute requiring parental
notification (not consent) before an abortion could be performed
on an unemancipated minor.187 In addition to arguing that the
provision was a violation of an intrinsic privacy interest, the un-
successful petitioner also seemed to suggest that young women in
her position would likely carry an unwanted child to term once
parental influence was brought to bear.'"
The control over stimulus output category subsumes not only
portions of the constitutional right to privacy, but also some of
the tort law. Prosser's public disclosure tort seems to be what most
concerned Warren and Brandeis in their seminal 1890 essay.2 9
Their fear, of course-an outgrowth of living in the wake of in-
stantaneous photography and other innovations-was that such
technological advances "threatened to make good the prediction
that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.' 1140
When Prosser drew his conclusions from an exhaustive review
135. A "chilling effect" is at issue to some degree in such cases. Aside from those
instances in which the body requesting the reluctant speaker to break silence is a congres-
sional investigation committee or grand jury, the control of stimulus output interest has
remained well intact here. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporter's privi-
lege with respect to facts concerning sources relevant to grand jury investigation); Uphaus
v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
136. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
137. Id. at 411-13.
138. Id. at 413. See also Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (requirement of signed consent form prior to abortion
upheld).
139. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12.
140. Id. at 195.
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of the then-extant privacy case law, he argued that for a public
disclosure of embarrassing facts to be actionable, it must be in fact
"public."14 Merely revealing the facts to one other person, or a
small group of persons, would be insufficient to activate the tort.
Others, notably Wade 14 2 and Hill, 4  have countered that the
unactionable one-to-one disclosure cases cited by Prosser were un-
helpful for theory-building, since they were "tainted" with the
privilege of communicating a report of debts owed. Cunningham v.
Securities Investments, Co.,44 for example, clearly upheld the "right
to take reasonable . . . action to pursue a debtor and persuade
payment, although the steps taken may result in actual but not
actionable invasion of the debtor's privacy.""" Two years after
Cunningham, an Iowa court ruled that even a letter to the debtor's
employer would not be actionable, in that employers have a "nat-
ural and proper interest in the debts of [their] employees."" 4
Within the proposed model, of course, even private disclo-
sures may adversely affect one's control over stimulus output. The
broader issue of breaches of "confidentiality" can thus be sub-
sumed within an individual's concept of privacy. One of the most
perplexing cases in this area is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California.147 At issue was a requirement that privileged communica-
tions-between therapist and client-be divulged in certain ex-
treme circumstances. The case set off a flurry of commentary in
legal and mental health journals."8
Although the model of privacy offered here does not distin-
guish true information from false, there are surely many situa-
141. Prosser, supra note 17, at 393; see also W. PRossER, supra note 32, at 810.
142. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1109 n.94,
1114 n.122 (1962).
143. Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLum. L. REV. 1205,
1287 (1976).
144. 278 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1960); see also Gouldman-Taber Pontiac v. Zerbst, 213
Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957).
145. 278 F.2d at 604.
146. Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962).
147. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1976).
148. Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects
of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. Rxv. 165 (1978); see also Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psycho-
therapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. REV. 358 (1976); Everstine, Everstine, Heyman,
Tone, Frey, Johnson & Seiden, Privacy and Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 35 AM. Ps,. 828




tions in which we would prefer that the data held by others about
us be accurate. The recording of credit reports and police records
are two such situations.14 9 There have been numerous incidents in
which unjustified detentions of innocent citizens, and in one case a
fatal shooting, were seemingly the result of computer file
inaccuracies.18 0
One final issue relating to stimulus output concerns a problem
posed by Prosser's appropriation tort. Cases in this area typically
have been seen as involving a property interest.151 As a number of
writers have begun to realize, however, part of the stimulus out-
put here is information-or rather, misinformation.1 52 Felcher
and Rubin put it this way:
[U]nauthorized endorsements-advertisements that use a person's photo-
graph or testimonial without his consent to recommend a product[]... vic-
timize[] the individual by creating the false impression of a particular busi-
ness relationship between him and the advertiser. They also victimize the
consuming public, because an unauthorized endorsement is essentially a false
claim about the product.15
3
Having reviewed the scope of stimulus output considerations, it is
now possible to examine the final category of the proposed model
of privacy-control over self-regarding conduct.
C. Control Over Self-regarding Conduct
In the first two parts of the proposed model, it was argued
that information control conceptualizations are unduly limiting,
and that stimulus control should be substituted as the appropriate
construct for categorizing privacy claims. In this Section the argu-
ment will be of a slightly different nature. Instead of arguing that
the traditional autonomy-based concepts are too narrowly drawn
(especially the Supreme Court's reliance on autonomy to engage
149. A. MiurLg, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging
Principles of First Amendment Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970); Note, Credit Investi-
gations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969); Comment, Mis-
leading Credit Reports: Alternatives for Recovery, 15 U. ToL L. REV. 877 (1984).
150. R. SMrrH, PRIvAcY: How TO Paomar WHAT's LEFr OF IT 37, 49 (1979).
151. Note, The Right of Publicity, supra note 46, at 529; see generally W. PRossER, supra
note 32, at 804-07 nn.22-51.
152. L. ERNsT & A. ScHwARTZ, PIVACY: THE RIGHT To BE LEFr ALoNE, 197-202
(1967); Feinberg, supra note 16, at 722-23; Felcher & Rubin, supra note 46, at 1600; Wig-
more, supra note 46, at 3-4; Winfield, supra note 46, at 29.
153. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 46, at 1600.
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in certain "fundamental" behaviors), it will be shown that such
concepts address the wrong issues altogether. More specifically, it
will be demonstrated that the Court's actual mode of handling the
privacy issue is the chronological reverse process of that which it
purports to use.
The first step the Court claims to take in adjudicating privacy
cases is to make a threshold determination concerning the "funda-
mentalness" of the behavior at issue.1" This step alone is no easy
task. Justice Goldberg, in his Griswold concurrence, advises that
judges must "look to the traditions and collective conscience of
our people" to discover the set of fundamental liberties. 5 He
goes on to suggest that only those rights whose denial would io-
late the "principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions" merit recognition as funda-
mental.18 6 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that this
process of setting forth the scope of fundamental liberties is not
merely difficult, but impossible: "Our Court certainly has no ma-
chinery with which to take a Gallup Poll. And the scientific mira-
cles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court
can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the '[collective]
conscience of our people.' ,9157
However difficult this threshold determination of funda-
mentalness may be, once it is accomplished, the next step is to
apply the standard of review appropriate to that determination.
Any law which is found to abridge a fundamental liberty can stand
only upon the state's showing of a "compelling interest," and the
Court will apply "strict scrutiny." Absent any fundamental liberty
in the balance, the standard of review is far less stringent. In such
cases, the Court demands only a "rational relationship" between
the statute and its intended goal.'"
In essence, then, the second step of the adjudication process
focuses on the nature of the state's competing interest. Such a fo-
cus is supposed to take place only after it is determined whether a
154. Note, Roe and Paris, supra note 10, at 1166-67; People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,
494-95, 415 N.E.2d 936, 944, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 954-55 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting),
cerL denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
155. 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965).
156. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
157. 381 U.S. at 519.
158. See generally L. TRME, AmERIcAN CONSrTIMONAL LAw § 11-4 (1978).
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fundamental liberty is in jeopardy. It has been pointed out, how-
ever, that the Court often "cheats" and allows the legitimacy of
the state's competing interests to influence the threshold determi-
nation. Louis Henkin puts it this way:
What ... is it that makes my right to use contraceptives a right of Privacy,
and fundamental, but my right to contract to work 16 hours a day or to pay
more for milk than the law fixes, not a right of Privacy and not fundamen-
tal? Is it, as some suspect, that the game is being played backwards: that the
private right which intuitively commends itself as valuable in our society in
our time . . . is called fundamental, and if it cannot fit comfortably into
specific constitutional provisions it is included in Privacy?1 89
A dissenting opinion from a recent New York State sodomy
casel60 also indicates that the second step may dictate the first.
The majority, in overturning that state's sodomy law, found the
right to engage in consensual sexual behavior a fundamental one.
Additionally, it distinguished these facts from those of an earlier
case upholding a drug law 61 as applied to private ownership of
marijuana. The right to use marijuana could not be deemed fun-
damental, the court reasoned, in that the issue of harmfulness to
the user had not yet been resolved in the scientific/medical com-
munity. Since the state failed to argue that sodomy was harmful to
the participants, the majority felt comfortable in concluding that
the right to engage in homosexual conduct in private was funda-
mental. 62 Judge Gabrielli said in dissent:
In order to determine whether the freedom to engage in a particular activity
is a constitutionally protected "fundamental right," we must look directly to
the ... Constitution. . . . The nature and extent of the State's interest in
regulating or proscribing the activity in question are simply not relevant
considerations at this stage of the inquiry. Indeed, it is only after the court
makes a threshold determination as to whether a particular State regulation
impinges upon a "fundamental right" that such considerations are brought
into play .... By suggesting that the activity proscribed in this case involves
a "fundamental right" simply because it entails no significant danger to
health, the majority has created a truly circular constitutional
159. Henkin, supra note 59, at 1426-27. See also Dunlap, Where the Person Ends, Does
the Government Begin? An Exploration of Present Controversies Concerning "The Right to Privacy,"
12 LiNcoLN L. REv. 47, 67-75 (1981).
160. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
161. People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640, 409 N.E.2d 840, 431 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1980).




At the theoretical level, courts' threshold determination of
fundamentalness is based upon a careful inspection of longstand-
ing tradition. In actual practice, however, the courts often decide
first upon the merits of the state's argument, and then allow this
finding to influence their assessment of the fundamentalness of
the liberty at issue. This charge can best be supported by examin-
ing pairs of Supreme Court decisions in which almost identical lib-
erties were at stake, yet the resolution of the conflict within each
pair was inconsistent.
1. The Stanley and Paris cases. In Stanley v. Georgia,'" the
appellant had been convicted of possessing obscene materials. Af-
ter pointing out that the Constitution "protects the right to re-
ceive information and ideas," ' 5 the Court moved on to the more
difficult question of determining how this general principle might
apply to admittedly obscene "information and ideas":
Georgia contends that ... there are certain types of materials that the indi-
vidual may not read or even possess. Georgia justifies this assertion by argu-
ing that the films in the present case are obscene. But we think that mere
categorization of these films as "obscene" is insufficient justification for such
a drastic invasion of personal liberties. . . . Whatever may be the justifica-
tions for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into
the privacy of one's home. If the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole con-
stitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds.'"
Four years after Stanley, the owners of the Paris Adult Thea-
tre in Atlanta asked that this same reasoning be extended by the
Court to deal with admittedly obscene material viewed in a public
movie theater.167 On the door of the theater was a sign which
read in part: "Adult Theater, You must be 21 and able to prove
it. If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter. 16 8
The appellants thus felt confident in arguing that only consenting
163. Id. at 496, 415 N.E.2d at 945, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56.
164. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
165. Id. at 564.
166. Id. at 565.
167. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
168. Id. at 52.
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adults were present in the theater. Although the trial court,""9 the
Georgia Supreme Court, 170 and the United States Supreme
Court71 were all willing to stipulate to this finding of fact, the
Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that "for us to say that our
Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving
consenting adults is always beyond state regulation is a step we are
unable to take. '17 2
It is difficult to reconcile the Court's decisions in Stanley and
Paris. Both cases, after all, involved the state telling willing view-
ers that they may not enjoy obscene materials, and both circum-
stances thus opened the state to charges of trying to "control
men's minds." For the Paris majority, the crucial difference was
the place in which the offense occurred:
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried
with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would
not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of "privacy
of the home," which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that "a man's
home is his castle . . . ." The idea of a "privacy" right and a place of public
accommodation are, in this context, mutually exclusive. 173
This reasoning cannot take us very far, though. It is not typi-
cally the case that criminal behavior, even if "victimless," becomes
noncriminal when conducted in the privacy of one's home. Prosti-
tution is illegal even if the transaction is consummated in private.
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,'74 the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed a federal trial court's finding that consensual sodomy
may be punished even if participants engage in the act behind
169. See Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre, 228 Ga. 343, 344-45, 185 S.E.2d 768, 769
(1971) (quoting unpublished trial court decision), vacated, 413 U.S. 49, reh'g denied, 414
U.S. 881 (1973).
170. 228 Ga. at 344-45, 185 S.E.2d at 769-70.
171. 413 U.S. at 68.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 66-67.
174. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.), affg 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E. Va. 1975), reh'g denied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976).
Since 1976, the Court has chosen to avoid'cases addressing the issue of lesbian and gay-
male lovemaking as behavior protected by Griswold's "emanations." See People v. Onofre,
51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980) (invalidating penal statute
which criminalized consensual sodomy or deviate sexual intercourse between unmarried
persons), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d
62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (invalidating statute which forbade loitering for purpose of soliciting
another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 4677 (1984).
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closed doors.
Perhaps the real reason that Stanley's behavior was covered
by privacy doctrine (and thus deemed "fundamental"), while an
almost identical behavior on the part of the Paris patrons was not,
concerns the nature of the state's competing interest. In Paris,
Chief Justice Burger wrote approvingly of "the interest of the
public in the quality of life and the total community environment
... ,"15 Society's interest in the community environment carried
the day in Paris yet failed to override the privacy interest in Stan-
ley. The reason is that Stanley's privacy was protected not because
his home was his castle, but because his living room was not in
plain public view. As such, his choice of reading material there
would not affect the total community environment. An "Adults
Only" sign, by contrast, serves not only to keep away the unsus-
pecting, but also to put passersby on notice that behavior which
they may strongly disapprove of is taking place within. Chief Jus-
tice Burger admits that this is the real distinction between the
cases when, in Paris, he quotes Alexander Bickel:
A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room, or expose him-
self indecently there. . . . We should protect his privacy. But if he demands
a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to fore-
gather in public places-discreet, if you will, but accessible to all-with
others who share his tastes, then to grant him this right is to affect the world about
the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies. Even supposing that each of us
can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth,
we cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes
upon us all, want it or not.
17
1
The difference between Paris and Stanley, then, is only inci-
dentally one of public place versus home. The real underlying is-
sue concerns when a self-regarding action becomes an other-
regarding action. One may agree or disagree with Chief Justice
Burger's assertion that the "Adults Only" viewing of obscene
materials affects a community's moral tone and is therefore regul-
able, but one should at least recognize that this was the real issue.
If this assessment of the true difference between Paris and
Stanley is correct, then the control over self-regarding conduct cat-
egory is more reflective of reality than is the notion of a "funda-
175. 413 U.S. at 58.
176. Id. at 59 (quoting Bickel, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22 THE PUBLIC IN-
TERESa 25-26 (1971)) (emphasis added by Justice Burger).
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mental" liberty. Stanley and the Paris Adult Theatre patrons were
both trying to exercise the same liberty; it simply makes no sense
to call that liberty fundamental in the one case but not so in the
other. The true distinction between Paris and Stanley-between
self- and other-regarding conduct-was also very much at issue in
the following pair of conflicting Supreme Court privacy decisions.
2. The Moreno and Belle Terre cases. In United States De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 77 the Court invalidated that por-
tion of the 1971 amendments to the 1964 Food Stamp Act which
limited the set of eligible "households" to groups of related indi-
viduals. Although Justice Brennan's majority opinion dealt with
the case as one of equal protection, rather than privacy per se,'78
the lower court opinion illuminates the tension between self- and
other-regarding behavior.
At the trial level, the government argued that even if the eli-
gibility restrictions were found to be unrelated to the legislative
intent behind the Food Stamp Act itself (i.e., affordably getting
food to poor people), those restrictions could still stand because
they would foster morality.'79 The court presented the state's ar-
gument this way: "Congress, it might be thought, denied federal
food assistance to hippy communes in an attempt to combat the
unconventional living arrangements popularly associated with
them."' 80 The court went on to counter this argument in a man-
ner reminiscent of Stanley:
While Congress may have power to legislate its conception of immorality in
some contexts .... its power to do so at the level at which this statutory
provision operates-in the household-is doubtful at best. Recent Supreme
Court decisions make it clear that even the states ... cannot in the name of -
morality infringe the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the
home.1""
Justice Brennan also acknowledged that the food stamp eligibility
restrictions were intended to "prevent so-called 'hippies' and
177. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
178. Id. at 533-38.
179. Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C.
1972). This argument was abandoned before the Supreme Court. Brief for Appellants at 9,
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).




'hippy communes' from participating .. ". ."181 He admonished
the government that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.
1 83
The crucial holding in Moreno, then, can be seen in terms of
the self- versus other-regarding conduct continuum. The lifestyle
enjoyed by this particular "politically unpopular group" (i.e., hip-
pies) was deemed by the Court to be outside the legitimate prov-
ince of the state's concerns. It was judged, in essence, a self-
regarding set of behaviors.
In the very next term after Moreno was handed down, the
Court produced a decision which at first blush seems wholly irrec-
oncilable with the earlier case.18' The Village of Belle Terre,
Long Island, zoned its tiny community so as to restrict occupancy
to one-family dwellings. A "family" was defined as any size group
such that no more than two household members could be unre-
lated by blood, marriage or adoption.85
The zoning ordinance was challenged by a handful of college
students who were not related to each other and who had rented
a home together in Belle Terre. Among the arguments presented
by the students was that "the restriction of those whom the neigh-
bors do not like trenches on the newcomers' rights of privacy;
• ..it is of no rightful concern to villagers whether the residents
are married or unmarried . .. ."18
In reversing the court of appeals decision which had upheld
the students' claims, Justice Douglas stated directly and without
explanation that the ordinace "involves no 'fundamental' right,
. ..such as. .. the right of association. . . or any rights of pri-
vacy."187 However, by confidently asserting that this case did not
concern a fundamental right (and therefore was not a privacy case
at all),188 Justice Douglas dealt with the issues "backwards"; he al-
lowed the nature of the state's competing interest to dictate the
182. 413 U.S. at 534.
183. Id. (emphasis original).
184. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
185. Id. at 2.
186. Id. at 7.
187. Id.
188. This state of affairs is especially puzzling in that Justice Douglas's concurring
opinion in Moreno, 413 U.S. at 541, had sought to treat the case as one of freedom of
association rather than equal protection under the law.
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proper standard of review.
What Justice Douglas did was to treat Belle Terre simply as a
zoning case.18 9 The focus of the majority opinion, then, was on
the nature of the state's arguments rather than on any notion of
privacy. The Village of Belle Terre argued that if its ordinance
was invalidated, its residents would be victims of overcrowding, be
confronted by a continuous flow of automobile traffic (and the re-
sulting parking problems), and be subjected to noise that invaria-
bly "travels with crowds." 190 In judging that these were legitimate
state interests rationally related to the provisions of the ordinance,
Justice Douglas wrote these words, hauntingly reminiscent of Jus-
tice Burger's opinion in Paris: "The police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people."
191
The point here is not that Moreno was a proper decision or
that Belle Terre was a misguided one, 192 but rather that the only
way for the Court to maintain even the appearance of consistency
between the two cases was to treat the conduct at issue in Moreno,
though not in Belle Terre, as self-regarding. Being a hippie, the
Court is saying, is a self-regarding action. Creating undesirable
overcrowding in a quiet residential area is an other-regarding ac-
tion. Objectively, the distinction may be devoid of logic and rea-
son, but again that is not the point. The fact that the Court is
actually distinguishing between the two cases in terms of the self-
versus other-regarding conduct continuum suggests that the pro-
posed model of privacy is a more accurate depiction of actual ad-
judication than is a model dependent upon a distinction between
fundamental and nonfundamental liberties.
Moreover, Justice Douglas's bare assertion that the students'
189. See 416 U.S. at 10.
190. Id. at 9.
191. Id.
192. But see City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 539 (1980), in which the California Supreme Court confronted facts similar to the
Belle Terre case but ruled in favor of tenants on the grounds that the zoning ordinance
violated the privacy provision of the California Constitution. See generally Gerstein, Califor-
nia's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private Life, 9 HASrIG~s
CoNsT. L.Q. 385 (1982).
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claims in Belle Terre were not fundamental193 hardly settles the
fundamental liberties doctrine question. Justice Douglas, after all,
does not specify why he reached this conclusion. Only one reasona-
ble inference can be drawn from the Douglas opinion: if the stu-
dents' claims are to be deemed nonfundamental, that judgment is
in turn premised upon the assumption that they involved other-
regarding conduct which the state had a reasonable and legitimate
interest in regulating.
3. An Alternative Interpretation of Roe v. Wade. As shown
above, the most plausible explanation for the pattern of opinions
in Paris and Stanley, as well as in Moreno and Belle Terre, is the
Court's assessment of the degree to which litigants' claims concern
self-regarding conduct. Additional evidence in support of the con-
trol over self-regarding conduct category can be gathered by look-
ing carefully at the Court's landmark abortion decision, Roe v.
Wade.'" "The right to privacy," wrote Justice Blackmun, "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."19 5 These words indicated Justice Black-
mun's belief that the right to an abortion is a fundamental liberty,
in that Griswold had defined the set of privacy rights as
fundamental.
The Blackmun opinion has been criticized vehemently by le-
gal commentators. 9 ' The critics' chief concern is Justice Black-
mun's failure to enunciate a constitutionally acceptable rationale
for the fundamental liberty status of abortion.'" At first reading,
it is not at all clear how Justice Blackmun attempts to justify his
conclusion that abortion is indeed a fundamental liberty. It might
be said that he uses a "distress test" aimed at showing how great a
burden would have to be borne by a woman whose abortion rights
were not recognized:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
193. 416 U.S. at 7-8.
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
195. Id. at 153.
196. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT (1981); Cincotta, The Quality ofLife:from Roe to
Quinlan and Beyond, 25 CATH. LAW. 13 (1970); Ely, supra note 58; Gerety, Doing Without
Privacy, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 143 (1981); Lackland, Toward Creating a Philosophy of Fundamental
Human Rights, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 473 (1975); Comment, Roe v. Wade-The Abor-
tion Decision-An Analysis and Its Implications, 10 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 844 (1973).
197. Ely, supra note 58, at 936-37, 947.
[Vol. 33
PRIVACY
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medi-
cally diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as
in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed moth-
erhood may be involved."a8
Justice Blackmun went on to argue that, fundamental or not,
the right to seek an abortion was not absolute. The state's coin-
peting interests must be taken into account. 1" He then proceeded
to review the current state of medical technology200 as he saw it,
and proclaimed that the point at which the state's interest be-
comes "compelling" (i.e., of such importance as to override even
the fundamental liberties involved) would depend upon the goal
of the regulation. Specifically, if the state's concern is with the
health of the mother, then the state's interest becomes compelling
after the end of the first trimester. Justice Blackmun's reason for
drawing the line here is "that until the end of the first trimester,
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal child-
birth."20 1 When the state's regulation is aimed at protecting the
"potential life" of the fetus, however, the line is drawn elsewhere.
Specifically, the states would be free to regulate-even pro-
scribe-abortions only after the "viability" of the fetus is
established.02
To summarize, then, Justice Blackmun claimed that the abor-
tion choice is fundamental, but could be overridden by a compel-
ling state interest aimed at protecting the woman or the fetus. It
seems that the fundamental liberties doctrine is being applied as
intended. However, a problem arises in that the "distress test" is
not a constitutionally acceptable means of determining that a lib-
erty is fundamental. Any government regulation causes stress for
those being regulated. Moreover, even the admittedly vague tests
198. 410 U.S. at 153.
199. Id. at 154.
200. For an argument against basing the scope of fundamental liberties upon the cur-
rent state of medical technology, see Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2506-09 (1983).
201. 410 U.S. at 163.
202. Id. Abortion could not be proscribed, however, if the operation is deemed neces-
sary for the woman's health. 410 U.S. at 164.
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the Court had grown accustomed to using in describing the
proper scope of the fundamental liberties doctrine (e.g., those
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"203 as identified
in the "collective conscience" of Americans) 20 4 are wholly ignored
by Justice Blackmun.20 5
A more reasonable way of making sense of Roe can be found
in the control over self-regarding conduct category of the pro-
posed privacy model. Justice Blackmun allows that there are three
possible state interests in abortion regulations: "to discourage il-
licit sexual conduct"; 0 "to protect the pregnant woman . . .
from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious
jeopardy"; 207 and to protect "prenatal life."208 Blackmun dismisses
the first of these possible state interests with little explanation,
pointing out that "no court or commentator has taken the argu-
ment seriously." 209 The second state interest he recognizes as le-
gitimate only after the first trimester, and even then only "to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health. '210 Finally, the state interest in
protecting the fetus may be written into law only if such law con-
cerns the "viable" fetus, usually taken to mean the third-trimester
fetus.211
What Justice Blackmun has done in essence is to place each of
these three state interests at different points along the self- to
other-regarding conduct continuum. Specifically, he sees sexual
morality per se in this context as purely self-regarding, while he
feels that a paternalistic interest in the well-being of the mother
can render the abortion choice more other-regarding. Even fur-
ther towards the other-regarding end of the continuum, the abor-
tion choice is pitted against the state interest in protecting the fe-
203. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
204. 381 U.S. at 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
205. This point is made in Note, Roe & Paris, supra note 10, at 1173-75, and Ely,
supra note 58.
206. 410 U.S. at 148.
207. Id. at 149.
208. Id. at 150.
209. Id. at 148.
210. Id.
211. Id. But see Rush, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion and Roe v. Wade: How Viable is
Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113, 119-20, 133-37 (1983) (reassesses the
scope of the state's interest in protecting the fetus).
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tus. In other words, Roe is saying that illicit sexual activity is a
privacy right, while getting yourself killed is not, and getting your
viable fetus killed is surely not. The fundamental liberties doc-
trine is of no help; indeed, Justice Blackmun skirts it altogether.
4. Fundamental liberty versus the significance of triviality. In
the paired comparisons between Stanley and Paris and between
Moreno and Belle Terre, and in the reinterpretation of Roe, strictly
descriptive evidence has been encountered for the superiority of
the control over self-regarding conduct category over the Court's
fundamental liberties doctrine. That is, the fundamental liberties
doctrine cannot explain what actually happened in these cases as
well as can the model of privacy proposed herein.
This Section will offer a set of more prescriptive rationales for
favoring the proposed model and discarding the fundamental lib-
erties doctrine. The argument to be presented is two-fold. First, it
will be shown that the process of determining which liberties are
"fundamental" is itself a form of substantive due process, the very
practice the Court claimed to shun in creating the fundamental
liberties doctrine. The second part of the argument depends upon
the axiom that the Court is supposed to be counter-majoritarian.
The use of the fundamental liberties doctrine, it will be shown,
tends to favor values espoused by majorities at the expense of
minorities.
Dean John Ely is probably Roe's harshest critic.2 1 In his cri-
tique of the decision, he accuses the Court of acting as a
"superlegislature," of engaging in substantive due process in the
worst sense of the phrase.2 13 "Were I a legislator," he chides the
Court, "I would vote for a statute very much like the one the
Court ends up drafting. I hope this reaction reflects more than
the psychological phenomenon that keeps bombardiers sane-the
fact that it is somehow easier to 'terminate' those you cannot see
"214
Ely sees in Roe an inescapable irony. The Court, he argues,
invented the fundamental liberties doctrine in order to avoid
charges of engaging in substantive due process and of usurping
212. Ely, supra note 58.
213. Id. at 939-43.
214. Id. at 926-27.
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the power of the legislative branch. 15 However, this very process
of determining on a case-by-case basis which liberties will be
deemed fundamental is to act as a legislature. The fundamental
liberties doctrine, according to Ely, is the formalization of the
worst of the substantive due process decisions from decades past.
It grants special protection "to those rights that somehow seem
most pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any
special solicitude for them. "216
The first of the prescriptive criticisms of the fundamental lib-
erties doctrine, then, is that it is merely a restatement of substan-
tive due process. The second prescriptive criticism is an argument
not only against the fundamental liberties doctrine itself, but for
the superiority of the proposed model over those models which
argue that autonomy-based privacy is meant to cover only one's
"intimate" or "personal" decisions. The argument here is that
some nonintimate, indeed seemingly trivial, claims are within the
province of privacy guarantees.
There is a disturbing vagueness surrounding the notion that
some issues are more "intimate" than others. Yet this intimacy
concept seems to carry the day with even those who argue for a
relatively broad autonomy-based right to privacy. Karst, for exam-
ple, claims that individuals should be free to form and maintain
"intimate associations," and carefully points out that such rela-
tionships are not limited to spouses or even lovers. 1 7 Indeed, even
the proverbial "one-night stand" would be protected-it might
lead, after all, to intimacy.21 8 The question which remains, how-
ever, is why autonomy should be considered valuable only when it
leads to intimacy.
It would seem to be a much better idea to assess indepen-
dently the value of autonomy, and then apply it across the board.
Bender, for example, suggests that autonomy is its own reward,
that we have decided over the years that our society would be one
that grants its citizens the maximum conceivable amount of auton-
215. Id. at 939.
216. Id. (emphasis in original).
217. Karst, supra note 3, at 629-30.
218. Id. Others use such limiting concepts as "intimate" or "personal"; see Note, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 4, at 1466; Gerety, supra note 4; Note, Fornication, supra
note 4 at 288.
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omy.219 It is possible-as Mill argues2 20 -that the autonomous cit-
izen is the most effective self-governor, and that the rest of us can
learn from such a person. However, this is not essential for
Bender's thesis.
Once autonomy is accepted as an intrinsic good, it must be
administered evenhandedly:
The right to enjoy sex in marriage, then, cannot be a more fundamental
private one than the right to enjoy sex outside of marriage, because that
would only reflect a choice that marriage is a better state than non-marriage,
and that is precisely the decision which a right of privacy must leave to the
individual, if marriage is, indeed, a private matter. Heterosexuality can't be
more fundamental than homosexuality. Nor can the right to spend one's
time and to use one's intellect and imagination by reading be more funda-
mental than the right to use mind-affecting drugs. It would be ironic indeed
if a right to make private choices were to be used to reward conformity to
the popular or "ideal" life-st3le
s1a
Two themes emerge from Bender's argument. The more obvious
of the two is that no one kind of intimacy can be deemed more
deserving of protection than another. However, Bender's refer-
ence to the use of mind-affecting drugs as a privacy right must
also be noted; autonomy must be valuable even if it does not lead
to intimacy.
Jeffrey Reiman shares the view that intimacy-based autonomy
values are far too narrow, even elitist:
[M]y right to parade around naked alone in my house free from observation
by human or electronic peeping toms is not a fundamental right. It is de-
rived from the fact that without this right, I could not meaningfully reveal
my body to the loved one in that exclusive way . . . . This strikes me as
bizarre. It would imply that a person who had no chance of entering into
social relations with others, say a catatonic or a perfectly normal person le-
gitimately sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary confinement, would
thereby have no ground for a right to privacy. This must be false, because it
seems that if there is a right to privacy it belongs to individuals regardless of
whether they are likely to have friends or lovers . .. .
Some of our more libertarian writers argue that the proper
test in determining what kinds of autonomy interests should be
219. Bender, supra note 4, at 40-41.
220. J.S. ML, supra note 11, at 69-74.
221. Bender, supra note 4, at 42.
222. Reiman, supra note 4, at 36. For additional arguments to the effect that privacy
itself is an elitist concept, see Siegel, supra note 76, at 147 and sources cited therein.
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protected is to assess how important the decision is to the agent
involved. Even H.L.A. Hart-in one of the admittedly weakest
portions of his argument advocating the Wolfenden Report find-
ings concerning the decriminalization of homosexuality224-relies
greatly upon the presumed importance of the action to the
individual:
Unlike sexual impulses, the impulse to steal or to wound or even kill is not,
except in a minority of mentally abnormal cases, a recurrent and insistent
part of daily life. Resistance to the temptation to commit these crimes is not
often, as the suppression of sexual impulses generally is, something which
affects the development or balance of the individual's emotional life, happi-
ness, and personality.'
Surely this is a perverse form of even the "distress test" pro-
posed by Justice Blackmun in Roe. 25 It is hoped that better rea-
sons can be formulated for prohibiting murder than that the po-
tential murderer will not be hurt too much by our intervention.
In the same vein, one writer has suggested that the reason the
appellant in Kelley v. Johnson s22  (upholding Suffolk County, Long
Island, Police Department's employee hair length code) could find
no shelter in the Griswold privacy doctrine is that "a policeman
forbidden to wear long hair has not suffered a diminution of his
ability to express profound emotional needs in a degree remotely
approaching that of a person barred from sexual expression.
2 7
Determining the scope of permissible autonomy on the basis
of the presumed importance of the action to the actor is impossi-
ble. To do so would require either the psychic powers to accu-
rately intuit and measure the appellant's level of motivation, or
223. REPORT OF THE ComsrrrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENcOS AND PNosMTirioN
[Wolfenden Report], Cmnd. No. 247 (1957).
224. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmERTr AND MoRiAtu 22 (Random House ed. 1963).
225. See 410 U.S. at 153. Still, Hart's version is not nearly so perverse as that identi-
fied by Becker with regard to the cases in which plaintiffs seek the right to refuse blood
transfusions on religious grounds. Beckersees a pattern emerging whereby the plaintiffs
prevail only if they are able to persuade the court that they genuinely believe they will be
condemned to Hell even for undergoing a physically coerced transfusion. Plaintiffs tend to
lose if the court believes that they believe they will be forgiven by the Almighty in the
event of a forced transfusion. See Becker, The Legal Aspects of the Right to Die: Before and Afier
the Quinlan Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823, 838 (1976).
226. 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (police department may enforce hair length code for its
officers).
227. Note, Fornication, supra note 4, at 292. But see F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A
FR Socm' , 34 (1981).
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the imposition of blatantly majoritarian dogma: that which is im-
portant is that which most people find important. This is the an-
tithesis of autonomy.
Furthermore, this Article contends that even the seemingly
most trivial decisions are eligible for protection as privacy
claims-precisely because they are trivial. As one writer, also fo-
cusing on the hair length issue, put it:
There is no doubt that any particular haircut is a minor event in one's life;
yet it derives its importance in this context from that very fact. By concern-
ing itself with the more trivial aspects of personal life. . . government may
be more intrusive than when it concerns itself with life's major events.
Should the state tell its citizens what clothes to wear, when to have dinner,
with whom to talk, what games to play and what toothpaste to use? Such
action would seem totalitarian."'1
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion from Kelley v. Johnson is
also instructive in this regard. A "trivial" right, he argues, may
become a highly significant one when it is abridged:
If little can be found in past cases of this Court or indeed in the Nation's
history on the specific issue of a citizen's right to choose his own personal
appearance, it is only because the right has been so clear as to be beyond
question. When the right has been mentioned, it has been taken for
granted.
2
Justice Marshall goes on to describe an exchange between Con-
gressmen Benson of New York and Sedgwick of Massachusetts at
the 1789 congressional debates over the wording of the proposed
Bill of Rights2 80 Benson thought that the right of assembly should
be explicitly granted, lest the government try to abridge it." 1
Sedgwick chided his colleague:
If the committee were governed by that general principle. . . they might
have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased...
but [I] would ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter
these trifles in a declaration of rights, in a Government where none of them
were intended to be infringed.23
From this exchange, Justice Marshall concludes:
Thus, while they did not include it in the Bill of Rights, Sedgwick and his
228. Note, On Privacy, supra note 4, at 762.
229. 425 U.S. at 251.
230. Id. at 251-52 (citing I. BRANT, THE BmL OF RIGHTS 53-67 (1965)).
231. 425 U.S. at 251.
232. Id. at 251-52 (citing I. BRANT, supra note 230, at 54-55) (emphasis added).
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colleagues clearly believed there to be a right in one's personal appearance.
And, while they may have regarded the right a trifle as long as it was
honored, they clearly would not have so regarded it if it were infringed .2
If individuals are barred from using the importance to the
actor of the particular behavior at issue as a gauge of the behav-
ior's fundamentalness, a different approach must be used. This
Article suggests that the appropriate gauge of what is a proper
privacy claim is not the action's importance to the actor, but
rather the action's unimportance to all but the actor. This, of
course, relates back to Mill's notion of self-regarding conduct. To
embrace Mill's "one very simple principle ' 23 as the proper scope
of autonomy-based privacy 25 is not, however, to answer the diffi-
cult questions posed by this brand of libertarianism. Mill cannot
explain in all cases if a given behavior is to be protected.
Moreover, it must be admitted that the very question of
whether a particular action is self-regarding is just that-a ques-
tion. For example, one's decision not to wear a helmet while rid-
ing a motorcycle may or may not be self-regarding. If the state's
only asserted interest is its preference that its citizens not go
around killing themselves, then this choice is probably self-regard-
ing.2 6 However, if the state tries to demonstrate that taxpayers
must pick up the tab for clearing up the carnage from the high-
ways, the argument is weakened.8 If it could be further demon-
233. Id. at 252.
234. The reference is to the first chapter of J.S. MiLL, supra note 11, at 13: "The
object of this essay is to assert one very simple princple... that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted.. . in interfering with the liberty or action of any of their number
is. . . to prevent harm to others."
235. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (legalizing private own-
ership of small quantities of marijuana). In Ravin, the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted a
self-regarding conduct-based definition of privacy: "One aspect of a private matter is that it
is private, that is, that it does not adversely affect persons beyond the actor, and hence is
none of their business" (emphasis original).
236. Mill would disagree here, of course, with Justice Blackmun's assessment of the
state's interest in protecting maternal health in the area of abortion regulations.
237. Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1972), affd men., 409 U.S. 1020
(1972).
The State of New York recently passed pioneer legislation mandating the use of seat
belts by persons driving or riding in the front seats of automobiles. See Oreskes, Leaders in
Albany Agree on Requiring the Use of Seatbelts, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1984, at 1, ed. 4. The
new law regulates activity which most commentators would probably categorize as self-re-
garding. One New York State legislator reportedly chided his colleagues that "next, in
seeking to promote good health, the state might require New Yorkers to jog, sleep 8 hours
a night or take vitamin C." It's All but Buckled Up, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1984, § 4, at 6, col.
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strated that debris carried in the wind would more likely produce
a life-threatening situation for others by hitting the unprotected
as opposed to the protected motorcyclist (e.g., a bit of debris
might temporarily blind the unhelmeted rider, causing the cycle
to fly out of control into the path of a pedestrian), the argument is
effectively destroyed.
The function of the third and final category of the proposed
model of privacy, then, is only to direct us to ask the right ques-
tions. The model itself cannot provide the answers. However, ask-
ing the correct question is a crucial first step in adjudicating any
controversy. As seen above, the correct question to be asked here
is to what extent an action is self-regarding, not to what extent it
is "fundamental," or even to what extent it concerns "intimate"
or "private" matters.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this Article, an attempt was made to
show that the model proposed herein would accurately describe
the scope of privacy claims in both tort and constitutional law. In
recent years, at least one writer-Gary Bostwick-has attempted
the same task." 8 Bostwick discussed such issues in his influential
California Law Review Comment written in 1976.239 It seems ap-
propriate to conclude the discussion of the privacy model pro-
posed here by comparing it with Bostwick's earlier endeavor.
Bostwick's model of privacy is composed of three categories:
repose, sanctuary, and intimate decision. Concerning his last cate-
gory, this Article has demonstrated a skepticism over any view of
privacy that is based upon an "intimacy" construct.240 "Repose"
2.
It appears that the Reagan administration intends to provide an incentive for other
states to follow New York's example. Specifically, the Department of Transportation is will-
ing to rescind its mandate directing automakers to begin providing "passive restraints"
such as air bags or automatic seatbelts if a large number of states pass laws requiring mo-
torists to use the seatbelts with which cars already are equipped. U.S. to Order Air Bags or
Automatic Seat Belts, Chicago Tribune, July 11, 1984, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
238. See Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 4.
239. Id. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 129-30, 610 P.2d 436,
439, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (1980) (California Supreme Court expresses approval of Bost-
wick's model). It was Bostwick's model of privacy that was adopted by Herbert McCloskey
and Alida Brill in their recent book, DmENasioNs oF ToLmuA.cN (1983).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 217-22. In fairness to Bostwick, it should be
noted that he does cite with approval Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), in which
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refers to an interest in being free from "anything that disturbs or
excites. ' 24 1 It is an interest in getting away from it all, in seclu-
sion. In a sense, "sanctuary" is the complement of repose. Where
repose seeks to block out certain stimuli, sanctuary attempts to
"keep certain things within"' 2 a zone of privacy. Sanctuary is
"preventing other persons from seeing, hearing, and knowing. 2 4 3
The chief difference between Bostwick's categories (repose/
sanctuary) and those adopted herein (control over stimulus input/
output) concerns the handling of traditional fourth amendment
privacy. Bostwick chooses to deal with all search and seizure
claims as issues of sanctuary, the freedom to keep stimuli in." In
the model proposed in this Article, the fourth amendment is seen
to raise issues of both stimulus input and stimulus output. If we
claim that the police had no right to search our home without a
warrant, that is a stimulus input consideration. If, in the next
breath, we claim that the materials uncovered in such a search
may not be used against us, we have moved over into the realm of
stimulus output interests. The same combination of interests ac-
crues to technologically sophisticated surveillance techniques. As
noted earlier,24 5 a "bug" involves stimulus input claims, in that it
is an electronic intrusion, as well as stimulus output considera-
tions, in that it is designed to gather information about us.
A further distinction between Bostwick's privacy model and
the one proposed here is worth mentioning. In the typology
adopted herein, all three categories have one unifying fea-
ture-the reference to a perceived interest in control. There is a
fair amount of support in the literature for the assertion that the
process of identifying commonalities among what appear to be
wholly disparate interests is itself a worthwhile endeavor. For ex-
ample, Reiman, who criticizes those seeking to separate "prop-
the Supreme Court of Alaska used a Millian "self-regarding conduct" definition of privacy
to decriminalize possession of small quantities of marijuana. Bostwick calls the Alaska ap-
proach the "none-of-their-business" doctrine, and claims that it "helps to clarify past opin-
ions and to predict the nature of future applications. . . ... Comment, A Taxonomy of Pri-
vacy, supra note 4, at 1481.
241. Comment, A Taxonomy of Privaiy, supra note 4, at 1451.
242. Id. at 1456 (emphasis added).
243. Id. Cf. Parker, supra note 44 (sees privacy as the ability to control those who may
physically sense us).
244. Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 4, at 1456.
245. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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erty" from "damaged reputation" claims rather than dealing with
both as privacy interests, admonishes:
Even if privacy rights were a grab-bag of property and personal rights, it
might still be revealing, as well as helpful in the resolution of difficult moral
conflicts, to determine whether there is anything unique that this grab-bag
protects that makes it worthy of distinction from the full field of property
and personal rights.
248
Further encouragement comes from Bloustein, who, in the pro-
cess of arguing that privacy is one-and not four-torts, chides
Prosser's disciples in this way:
The study and understanding of law, like any other study, proceeds by way
of generalization and simplification. To the degree that relief in the law
courts under two separate sets of circumstances can be explained by a com-
mon rule or principle, to that degree the law has achieved greater unity and
has become a more satisfying and useful tool of understanding.2 47
From Reiman and Bloustein's work emerges a strong argu-
ment for students of privacy to do what has been attempted here:
identify a unifying principle and explicate it. Others have
presented their own suggestions as to what such a unifying privacy
theme might be, ranging from "personhood,"' ' 8 to physical ac-
cess,24 9 to "human dignity." 250 In contrast, this Article focuses
upon control as the proper unifying theme. Robert E. Smith con-
cludes his recent book on privacy with a defense of such a focus:
Control. That's what we have been talking about in this book. Privacy is the
right to control your own body, as in the right to have an abortion or the
right to whatever sexual activities you choose. Privacy is the right to control
your own living space, as in the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Privacy is the right to control your own identity, as in the right
to be known by a name of your own choice and not a number, the right to
choose your own hair and dress styles, the right to personality. Privacy is the
right to control information about yourself, as in the right to prevent dis-
closure of private facts or the right to know what information is kept on you
and how it is used.
2 5 1
Control is also the focus of this Article. After elucidating the lack
of explanatory power of the "information control" view of pri-
246. Reiman, supra note 4, at 33.
247. Bloustein, supra note 9, at 965.
248. See Craven, supra note 4.
249. See Parker, supra note 44.
250. See Bloustein, supra note 9.
251. R. SmrrH, supra note 150, at 321.
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vacy, a preference for focusing instead upon stimulus input and
stimulus output control was expressed and defended. Similarly,
this Article pointed out the descriptive and prescriptive deficien-
cies of the autonomy-based "fundamental liberties" privacy doc-
trine. In the proposed model, the doctrine is rejected in favor of
the Millian concept of control over self-regarding conduct.
Justice Holmes once asserted that any new idea "offers itself
for belief and if believed is acted on unless some other belief out-
weighs it . ". .., If the purpose of model construction is to clar-
ify, the model builder is thus in a no-lose position. The new model
will either be believed and acted on-a clear victory-or will stir
others to produce a better model whose explanatory powers will
"outweigh" those of the proposed model, and will thus clarify
even further.
252. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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